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REPLY
Lawrence Hirschfeld
I n principle, it seems a sensible, even attractive, move to combinemethod and theory across disciplines and research traditions toaddress a common problem. How, you ask yourself, can it hurt toincrease the size of our analytic and investigatory toolboxes? Often,however, the cold light of day—and one's colleagues' scrutiny—can
cast a sobering shadow.
Take this project. On reflection, it is not obvious why I imagined that
comparativist scholars committed to a social constructionist perspective
would be engaged, let alone convinced, by my argument. After all, it is an
argument about the constitution of racial belief that is baldly psychologi-
cal in its derivation and ensnared in methods of experimental investiga-
tion that every introductory anthropology student comes to believe are
part of a contrived effort to efface the very cultural context that the field
is committed to explore. And, adding insult to injury, against years of work
showing that psychological reductionism is a hopeless mystification of an
issue of power and authority, I conclude that there is a conceptual, mental
priority to understanding racial practices. Exactly what did I expect?
To be honest, much worse. I cannot pretend that the commentators
do not convey a deep skepticism about both the project's methods and
conclusions. But I am heartened by the clear and close readings given the
paper, and the evident understanding of the argument the commentators
obviously have. Indeed, I was frequently struck by how cogently my
position is grasped and engaged if not acceded to. Many of the points
raised are significant, and many signal a need for further work, particu-
larly Hacking's skepticism about the way cognitive developmental theory
has embraced and perhaps contorted theories long debated in philosophy,
Dominguez and Stoler's concern that there may be limits to how micro
our gaze on politics can be, and Estroffs caution that experiments are
useful to the extent that they inform us of everyday thinking.
Arguably the crucial reservation is Ilughes's closing notice that it may
well not matter whether there is a special-purpose cognitive device
underlying racial thinking—what counts is how to teach children "to
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appreciate difference and value diversity in ways that we, as adults, have
not" (p. 123). I find the idea sympathetic but potentially dangerous. How
can we expect to develop methods of teaching without understanding the
processes of learning? Does it make sense to motivate someone to diet by
telling them they do not feel hunger? Does it make sense to motivate
antiracism by telling children, through multicultural touring, that racial
differences are valuable but not deep ("we're all the same under our
skins") when every athletic shoe commercial tells them the former is not
the case and their own private experience says the latter is not possible?
In short, how can we expect the form of challenge not to change with the
nature of the beast? Understanding is critical. It just isn't enough.
So, let me begin by rehearsing my argument as well as the logic of
the research design meant to assess it. Then I propose to review its moves
in an attempt to answer and acknowledge the criticism and commentary
offered.
THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF
1. Race as a category of mind is distinct from race as a category of
power. The distinction is logical (one cannot have a category of
power without having a corresponding category of mind) and
possibly causal (e.g., it has been argued that race is a category of
mind because of the role it plays in organizing power relations).
2. Racial thinking is intimately linked to essentialist reasoning. Most
frequently this linkage has been explained in the following way:
essentialist reasoning emerges as a function of the fundamental
support such reasoning provides the political use of race.
3. An alternative interpretation is that race is essentialized because
human psychological endowment includes an innate tendency to
organize information about other humans in a very specific way.
This tendency includes an essentialist heuristic.
4. We can test between the alternative causal accounts by investigat-
ing whether race is essentialized because it is politicized or
whether it is essentialized because it is organized around innate
principles of reasoning.
5. Conclusion: Race is recruited as a category of power because of
the properties it has in virtue of being a domain-specific category
of mind.
Let us consider each point in turn.
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Race in the Mind Can Be both Logically and Empirically Distinguished
from Race in Society
Consider first the logical distinction. When thinking about race,
people (at least in modern American society) engage in two analytically
separable acts. On the one hand, they distinguish racial kinds (to adopt
the more careful language Ian Hacking recommends). On the other hand,
they differentially rate individuals in virtue of their supposed membership
in particular racial kinds. Clearly this latter point is linked to, even
arguably a function of, relations of power: the correlation between sys-
tems for rating racial kinds and differential positions in hierarchies of
power and authority is massive. Distinguishing racial kinds, in contrast,
is not necessarily (although it might be in empirical fact) linked to
relations of power and authority but is necessarily linked to questions of
mental processing: discriminating (in the psychological sense) between
different races is logically prior to discriminating (in the political sense)
against members of different races. We cannot value something over
something else, show preference for something over something else, fear
something over something else, and so on unless we can tell the two things
apart.
The critical question, then, is not whether these two things—what I
have called racialism, on the one hand, and racism, on the other—can be
analytically kept separate, but whether there is an empirical contingency
linking the emergence of one with the emergence of the other. Neither a
psychological nor political analysis is adequate by itself. For example, let's
accept, for a moment, that races are psychologically distinguished only
because of the political "work" the system of racial thinking does. This
would not diminish the need for a description at the level of psychological
representation, since, as already observed, the act of political discrimina-
tion presupposes the act of psychological discrimination. This observa-
tion in itself may not be particularly compelling—not because it is trivial,
which I believe it is not—but because it does little to untangle the causal
relationship between racialism (race as a category of mind) and racism
(race as a category of power). That is, on the basis of these data alone, we
cannot tell which, if either, has priority.
Racial Thinking Is Intimately Linked to Essentialist Reasoning
Luckily there is a third phenomenon in the mix, essentialism. Race,
like other features of our (both constructed and encountered) environ-
ment, is essentialized in the sense that racial identity is thought to be
determined by a hidden essence that develops in the process of natural
reproduction and is thought to be shared by all members of a particular
racial kind. While essentialist construals play a central role in the repro-
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duction and legitimization of power and authority, essentialist reasoning
invariably plays a central role in racial systems for reproducing and
legitimizing power and authority. The question of interest is whence racial
essentialism? The most frequently voiced answer is that essentialism in
racial thinking develops as a function of power relations. In essentializing
race, not only are racialized relations of power and authority naturalized
(grounded in the facts of nature), but racialized relations of power and
authority are untethered from the ambiguous and (literally) superficial
manifestations of race, its visual correlates. Essentialism, as Stoler pro-
poses, provides a tactical mobility that allows race to be understood in
remarkably flexible ways despite its apparent basis in human physical
variation.
This explanation seemingly encounters difficulty given the general-
ized willingness, according to Medin and his associates, of humans to
essentialize virtually anything, particularly any category of things. This
difficulty is only apparent, however, since a political interpretation of
racial essence supposedly explains a critical feature of the distribution of
essentialist reasoning: not all categories and kinds that humans recognize
are as readily essentialized. Indeed, race (and gender) turn out to be more
essentialized than many other familiar strategies that humans use in
sorting the social world into relevant kinds (e.g., occupational kinds that
capture habitual patterns of functional behavior, or kinds of personality
that capture habitual patterns of enduring affect). The reason is that race
(and gender) are more essentialized because race (and gender) are more
implicated in the organization and regulation of power. Voila, prima facie
proof that mental representations of race take their form because of the
political function these representations serve.
Race Is Essentialized, in Part, Because Human Psychological
Endowment Includes an Innate Tendency to Organize Information about
Other Humans in a Very Specific Way
I propose an alternative account. Human cognition organizes infor-
mation in a way that makes essentializing a range of human collectivities
virtually inevitable. In particular, this essentialist understanding is the
product of a domain-specific competence for parsing the world into
human kinds of which race is one instantiation. More specifically, the
human-kind competence is a conceptual structure that takes as input
information about human variation and produces as output the principles
necessary for forming the frequently encountered folk belief that humans
can be partitioned into distinct types or kinds on the basis of their
concrete, observable constitution.1 This is not to argue that humans are
naturally partitionable into such kinds. Rather it is to argue that people
believe that humans can be so partitioned. The notion of observable
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constitution is not limited to surface features that are thought "racial"
(e.g., skin or hair color), but captures the more general idea that racial
differences are embodied, natural, enduring, and encompassing of nonob-
vious or inner qualities (including moral and mental ones) as well as
outward physical ones.
This, I hope, defuses Hacking's concern that the human-kind com-
petence might underwrite ideas about virtually any sort of human affili-
ation. The human-kind competence, should it exist, is a conceptual tool
for developing an understanding of intrinsic human variation, a way
precisely to distinguish critical identities and statuses that endure and
are part of a corporate logic of social organization from those that are
transitory and idiosyncratic.2 On the other hand, there is no reason to
believe that because human kinds are thought to be embodied that they
are tied to a specific range of visual manifestations. As Stoler makes clear,
one of the most important things that essence does is allow us to be
mistaken about identity via visual inspection alone.3
What of racial kinds? There exist a number of human kinds that are
defined in terms of their concrete, observable constitution and in terms
of their intrinsic natures (e.g., gender, caste, possibly age-grades). What
distinguishes racial from other human kinds is that racial kinds are in
principle capable of comprehensive self-reproduction. You do not need
more than one racial kind to produce a viable social system. Contrast, in
this regard, racial to other candidate human kinds (e.g., gender). A female
cannot reproduce without a male. Similarly, a single caste cannot repro-
duce the social system in which it is embedded without other castes,
despite the fact that castes are largely endogamous. (The caste system is
by definition a complex division of articulated labor; without the other
castes no one caste can exist.) Races, in contrast, to the degree they are
embedded in such existential divisions of labor, are so embedded in virtue
of empirical (imperial) fact, not definition. Races are capable of sustaining
themselves without, both figurative and literal, intercourse with other
races.
The move from human to racial kind is not simply a move from more
general to more specific, but one from potential belief to realized belief.
That is, racial kinds are instantiations of a human-kind potentiality. This
instantiation occurs only when the conceptual competence makes con-
tact with cultural discursive and political economic environments. The
human kind competence may stand apart from these environments but
a human kind—that is, a fully interpreted belief about intrinsic human
difference—cannot. But this radical dependence on the cultural and
political environments does not imply that race derives its fundamental
features from those environments or that it exists in our minds because
of those environments. Rather, these environments recruit a mental
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potential and use it to index, map, legitimize, and explain a particular
distribution of power and authority.
We Can Assess This Claim by Comparing the Conceptual
Representations of Race in Environments in which Race Is Politicized
with Environments in which It Is Not
The comparativist argument that race is conceptualized as a function
of its role in organizing the distribution of power and authority is convinc-
ing to the extent that all and only politically charged systems of racial
thinking are essentialized. It is not convincing in the event that there are
racial systems that are essentialized but not politicized. As Dominguez
notes, given the hegemonic success of the European and American
imperial projects, finding instances of this sort may no longer be possible,
even if they existed in the past. There is, however, one possible compara-
tive study that can still be done. It involves children—indeed our (i.e.,
European and American) children. We know from previous research that
children's racial thinking undergoes significant change during the first
decade of life. These involve changes in the sorts of things represented in
racial categories and the sorts things done with racial categories. I
speculated that this opens up an interesting possibility. We can examine
whether the sorts of things represented in racial categories change as a
function of the sorts of things done with racial categories. In short, we can
explore whether racial categories take their form because of the potency
they have for organizing children's political lives or whether they take the
form that they do independent of that organization. I suggest that the
evidence supports the latter. Children, who otherwise do not politicize
race, essentialize it.
Hence, Race Becomes a Category of Power in Virtue of Its Properties
As a Domain-Specific Category of Mind
Several commentators were not convinced. They argue that an
alternative interpretation is equally plausible, that it is the politics of race
that shapes these young children's beliefs. My error was having focused
attention on too limited a view of the political arenas. After all, several
commentators noted that the politics of race indelibly shapes the lives of
American children and is indelibly inscribed in American public dis-
course. Imagining that children are outside the scope of American racial-
ist and racist politics is naive, to put the most charitable interpretation
on it. I agree. Children's lives are as much influenced by racial politics as
those of the adults with whom they live. We are not focusing on their lives
in the sense of their life chances, the likelihood that they will live in
poverty, suffer ill-heath, or attend substandard schools. The question is
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whether children use race to organize those arenas of the life space that
they control. Children's lives are governed by adults but not entirely
controlled by them. Children have agency. They exercise that agency in
all sorts of ways—as any parent can attest. The relevant question is, in
those arenas in which children do have agentic potential, what role does
race play? I believe the evidence here is both striking and informative:
when it comes to structuring the environments in which children exercise
significant control (e.g., the playground), race plays a minor role at best.
A second set of concerns turns on whether children themselves
develop an appropriate repertoire of racial beliefs as readily as I suggest.
Dominguez and Stoler doubt this, contending that "race is, in fact, not
easy to learn" (See Dominquez, p. 97). Dominguez supports this by
observing that "adults exposed to racial thinking through conquest or
migration are often puzzled and 'misread' the signs. Biologists, physical
anthropologists, and geneticists have never even agreed on how many
different 'races of mankind' there are, nor what criteria of classification
to use. . . . Official U.S. censuses have never agreed either, even in the
context of the United States alone. Who, then, thinks that 'race' is easy
to learn?" (p. 97). Two problematic assumptions underlie her argument.
The first is the assumption that the development of an ability among
adults lacking that ability closely resembles the development of that
ability in children. Adults exposed to new languages through conquest or
migration have great difficulty manipulating new linguistics signs. Yet,
language is easy for children to acquire. It is just difficult for adults to do
so. Why? Because children have access to a language-acquisition device,
adults do not. I believe that there are parallels between children's and
adults' social reasoning abilities. Similarly, just because the criteria for
category membership is difficult to identify (or perhaps is even impossible
to identify), this does not mean that it is difficult to acquire the category.
Many categories whose membership criteria are difficult or impossible to
identify are readily learned, often without any tuition at all (try to define,
e.g., a mug versus a cup or a tree versus a shrub). One thing that we know
is not a measure of learnability is the amount of effort adults invest in
teaching it. Bowel control and natural-language grammars, to pick exam-
ples almost at random, are the focus of enormous parental attention and
intervention. Parents worry, cajole, and seek all sorts of expert advice on
how best to improve their children's speech and hygiene. But the bulk of
evidence overwhelmingly supports the fact that children develop these
skills largely on their own, independent of their parents' anxieties and
efforts. Colonial administrators' concerns about the racial affiliations of
Dutch children raised in the colonies is compelling evidence of how
colonial administrators organize their understanding of the world, as
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Stoler notes. However, as an account of cognitive development, it is not
all that informative.
Consider now a third concern raised by several commentators;
namely, whether race is as two-dimensional as I portray it. I do not have
a two-dimensional image of race; race is a way of reducing the dimensions
that we see in others. Take Estroffs example of differential diagnosis and
hospital admission rates among blacks and whites. It is not I who simpli-
fies race by reducing people to a racial status alone, as Estroff seems to
suggest. It is the health care professionals whose decisions create the
differential racial rates of involuntary admissions. What is complex about
race is not its surface level manifestation; indeed, from that perspective
race is "simple." What is complex about race is the depth of our cognitions
about it. But what of personal experience? Do not the sorts of tasks I pose
to young children violate the scope and depth of self engagement with
race and racism? Do not they distort and ignore the very cognitive depth
I just cited? Estroff argues that the "reciprocal and influential relation-
ships between identifying others and self are self-evidently important to
understanding one's racial beliefs (p. 114). This is a strong, and intuitively
plausible, claim. Yet, a growing body of literature now suggests that self-
and other-identification and reasoning are largely independent of each
other, at least with respect to race (see Gross 1985, 1991 for reviews).
The long-held and influential view that black children's preference for
white dolls meant that black children's self-image was damaged is predi-
cated on the assumption that there must be just the "reciprocal and
influential relationships between identifying others and self as Estroff
proposes (p. 114). Yet, surprisingly, this appears not to be the case. The
reason is that the understanding of who each of us is personally is quite
different from understanding who each of us is with respect to the various
groups to which we belong and the positioning each of these groups has
in social hierarchies. Thus, while I am as confident as Estroff that Patricia
Williams provides articulate testimony on the subjective experience of
prejudice, I am considerably less sure that this testimony conflicts with
what we discover by examining the group performance of a sample of
preschoolers on a series of controlled tasks. Williams's testimony is about
one thing, the preschoolers' pattern of performance is about another.4
This disjunction between inner experience and attribution of social
meaning should not be all that unfamiliar to anthropologists. As Ap-
padurai (1990) notes, the pragmatic consequences of social engagement
include interiorizations that are at once psychological and inauthentic (in
the sense that they conflict with personal experience and affect). Thus,
begging in South Asia, he suggests, "works" (for the beggar) because the
conduct of public life draws the potential donor into a "community of
sentiment" that guides and shapes behavior while leaving the donor's
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"real" internal landscape unaffected (1990:107-110). Charity does not
require sympathy or benevolent sentiment, only that a certain ecology of
conduct exists. Part of the power of that ecology is that it is parasitic on
precisely the sorts of two-dimensional portrayal that gives substance to
the interiorization of social position rather than the infinitely richer
experience of self as (semi)autonomous agent, which has unique and
(semi)private access to affect.
These remarks do not address all the important issues raised in the
rich and informative commentaries. Still, I hope they give a sense of my
appreciation for the thoughtful reading that the piece received. In the end,
I have to admit, I believe that a theoretically and methodologically
collaborative effort is not only sensible but can thrive and be mutually
informative.
ADDENDUM
Diane Hughes raises several specifically methodological questions
that demand a more detailed response. Hughes contends that I have
misconveyed previous research in the developmental literature as well as
misinterpreted my own research findings. For instance, Hughes claims
that studies of cross-race friendships reveal a more biased pattern of
behavior than I suggest. This is an important point: if young children are
in fact more racially exclusive in their friendships than I portray, this
would fundamentally undermine my argument that race is not politicized
by preschoolers. Hughes cites several studies that show a pattern of bias
in friendships. Unfortunately, she combines here research on pre-
schoolers with research on school-aged, including adolescent, children. I
do not contend that children generally do not politicize race, but rather
that young children (preschoolers) do not do so. There is no doubt that
children develop the bias patterns of association typical of the adults
around them. The question is when. A large number of studies show that
preschool and school-aged children are reliably different in their willing-
ness to enter cross-race friendship. None of the work Hughes cites
suggests otherwise.5
What of preschooler children's racial attitudes, Hughes asks? Is there
not considerable work showing that during the preschool years children
develop strident racial prejudices? Does this not indicate that race is
politicized? Indeed, I discuss this work in the body of the article, noting
that it indicates that children use race to project properties that do not
necessarily fall under the notion of race itself. The relevant question is
whether these attitudes represent evidence that children are using race
in the same way that the adults around them do. In fact, they indicate
just the opposite. For adults there is an imperfect but demonstrable
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relationship between attitudes and action. Adult racial prejudice influ-
ences adult practices of inclusion and exclusion. For children, this is not
the case. Children's racial prejudices do not predict patterns of associa-
tion. And this is not because children's prejudices generally do not predict
patterns of association, as studies of gender belief, stereotype, and bias
show (Fagot et al. 1986; McCandless and Hoyt 1961)
Hughes also suggests that my finding that preschoolers understand
that race is immutable is inconsistent with widely accepted work by
"developmental psychologists." In fact, a number of studies, indeed
influential studies, indicate that preschoolers do understand that race and
gender are immutable both over the life span and over superficial trans-
formations. While Hughes is correct that previous research suggested
otherwise (see Aboud and Skerry 1983; Semaj 1980), more recent work
has challenged these findings and called into question the reliability of
the research design on which they were based. Bern (1989), Siegal and
Robinson (1987), Springer (1995), and Taylor (1996), for example, pro-
vide compelling evidence—entirely consistent with my work—that pre-
schoolers expect both gender and race to be fixed at birth and be
immutable. The problem with previous research, Bern (1989) and Siegal
and Robinson (1987) point out, is that earlier studies used a task that
biases children against making judgments that constancy is maintained.
The traditional strategy for assessing a child's grasp of either gender or
racial constancy has been to ask the child whether a person's identity
changes when superficial changes are made to that person's appearance.
For example, is a black person wearing a blond wig and white makeup still
a black person? When preschool children say, as researchers found that
they do, that the person is no longer black, this has been interpreted as
evidence that they do not grasp constancy. But, as Bern (1989) points out,
asking children to make identity judgments on the basis of sudden
changes in appearance is curious since children virtually never encounter
such changes in the course of daily experience. Such judgments may be
informative of what children believe about the experimenter's intention
and how much they want to please the experimenter; but they probably
have little relevance to children's understanding of constancy. Indeed,
Siegal and Robinson (1987) found that by simply reversing the order of
the question (i.e., by asking is the person the same gender after the
transformation as before the transformation), the proportion of pre-
schoolers who showed constancy rose from one-third to three-quarters.
Hughes's most disturbing claim is that I misinterpret my own find-
ings. Specifically, she argues that I misrepresent the findings of studies
alluded to in the article but not discussed in detail there. In the earlier
article I argue that by three years of age, children have a much more
adult-like understanding of race, and particularly racial essentialism, than
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previous scholars have credited them with. Even quite young children
expect racial identity to be linked to family background, inherited, and
impervious to environmental influence. Thus, for example, even three-
year-olds believe that a child is more likely to racially resemble its parents
than to resemble them in physique. Hughes's interpretation of the same
results is quite different. She reviewed the relevant publications and
claims that when I
presented three-year-olds with stimuli that contrasted race, occupation, and body
build, they were likely to choose race over body build as a basis for continuity in growth,
but not as a basis for continuity in inheritance. Importantly, however, they were as
likely to choose occupation as they were to choose race as a basis for continuity in
growth and inheritance. Four-year-olds were likely to select race over body build in the
inheritance but not the growth condition, and to choose race over occupation in the
growth but not the inheritance condition. Only seven-year olds consistently chose race
over body build and race over occupation as a basis for continuity in both the growth
and the inheritance conditions, an observation that is consistent with psychologists'
findings regarding constancy, [p. 120]
What accounts for these radically different interpretations of the
same data? Answering this question requires describing the research
design in slightly more detail (a comprehensive description of the re-
search and its design can be found in Hirschfeld 1995, 1996). To avoid
the task demand of previous research (which asked children to make
identity judgments in the face of sudden changes in appearance), I asked
children to make identity judgments in the context of naturally occurring
changes with which even young children are familiar, namely the changes
and continuities inherent in growth and inheritance. Children know that
some aspects of a growing organism's appearance change over time while
other aspects do not. They also know that an organism resembles in
appearance its parents, yet it is also different in appearance from them.
We could exploit this knowledge in order to examine children's
understanding of constancy (by asking children if a person's race remains
the same over the course of the life span or by asking them if a person's
children are likely to be the same race as that person). The problem is
that this task would be too simple: children would surely answer yes on
the basis of token identity alone. A more difficult task would pit race
against some other physical feature. If children are unsure of racial
constancy then they should expect that a person's race changes during
his or her lifetime as is their body build or even their habitual activities
(as captured by occupation). Similarly, children should readily expect
that their parents offspring will be as likely to resemble that person
racially as they are to resemble them in body build or in habitual activity.
To test this, we showed one group of children a drawing of someone
whose race, body build, and occupation are evident, and then showed
them comparison drawings of two children, one of whom resembles the
Reply • 137
person in body build and occupation, the other of whom resembles the
person in race and occupation. If they do not grasp racial constancy, when
asked which comparison drawing is a picture of the person when they
were a child, children should be as likely to pick the first comparison
drawing as the second. We showed a second group of children the same
triad of drawings and asked them which child is the person's offspring.
We reasoned that if they do not grasp constancy then they should be as
likely to select the first comparison drawing as they are to select the
second comparison drawing. Children who were posed the first question
("show me the picture of X when he/she was a child") participated in the
growth condition; children who were posed the second question ("show
me the picture of X's child") participated in the inheritance condition.
We presented children with three triads; in the first triad race was
pitted against body build, in the second race was pitted against occupation
(habitual activity), and in the third occupation was pitted against body
build. The contrast of greatest interest here is the one in which race is
pitted against body build (the critical questions being how often children
chose the comparison drawing that matched the initial drawing racially
and how often they chose the comparison drawing that matched the initial
drawing in body build). This contrast is important because both race and
body build are corporeal traits, literally embodied. Moreover, both are
inherited aspects of appearance and both are informative of the popula-
tion from which one is descended. If children grasp racial constancy—be-
lieve that race is immutable over the life span and inheritable—then they
should choose the racially matched comparison drawing more often than
the one that matches in physique. Table 1 reports the percentage of the
time children selected the comparison drawing that matched the initial
drawing racially (i.e., how often they chose race over body build). Note
that random selection is 50 percent.
I first looked to see whether children's responses to the growth
question differed significantly from their responses to the inheritance
question. The issue is of interest because, unlike adults, young children
Table 1
Frequency with which children in three age groups chose a comparison drawing that
matched the initial drawing's race rather than body build.
3-year-olds 4-year-olds 7-year-olds
Growth condition 72.5 70 100
Inheritance condition 64.5 82 96
Average 68 76 98
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may not understand that continuities in growth and continuities in
inheritance involve (more or less) the same biological processes. Strik-
ingly, there is no reliable difference between the children's performances
on the two conditions. The appropriate data to analyze, then, are the
averages across the two conditions. The analysis revealed that although
the effect increased with age (i.e., older children were more confident in
their judgments than younger children), children in all three age groups
expected a person's race to be immutable. Hughes, to repeat, claims that
this is not the case. She argues that four-year-olds but not three-year-olds
reliably show constancy only in response to the inheritance question, and
that three-year-olds but not four-year-olds reliably show constancy only
in response to the growth question. Her reasoning, however, is flawed
because she ignores the fact that the two sets of means cannot be
statistically distinguished from one another (i.e., she has no warrant to
compare across conditions that are not significantly different). Hughes
analyzes the data as if there were a stable difference between the two sets
of means, when in fact there is none. In short, she is making a distinction
that the statistics do not support. This sort of reliance on the "raw" data
(the numbers do fall out in the direction she suggests, there is just no
reason to believe that they are reliably patterned in this way) rather than
using inferential statistics to guide our conclusions is, I suspect, precisely
the sort of error that psychologists are convinced anthropologists are
likely to make.
NOTES
1. This characterization is drawn from and corrects some ambiguities in a proposal
outlined in Hirschfeld 1996.
2. An alternative proposal is that human kinds are all and only those kinds that have been
essentialized, the essentialization deriving from a general willingness to essentialize catego-
ries (as Medin has suggested) or a specific willingness to essentialize nonhuman living kinds
extended to human collectivities (as a number of cognitivists and historians have suggested).
I, however, do not think that the evidence supports either the domain-general or the
tethered-to-biology, domain-specific interpretation, but interested readers might look at
Hirschfeld 1996 and Gelman and Hirschfeld in press for fuller discussions of this point.
3. I was surprised that several of the commentaries, including Dominguez, Estroff, and
Hacking, see me as taking race to be a visual ideology. Indeed, like Stoler, I believe that race
invariably involves talk about the visual, but as invariably involves beliefs about essences—es-
sences that explain why the visual is an imperfect guide to racial distributions.
4. For readers interested in more detailed methodological information can consult
Hirschfeld 1996. Suffice to say, pace what several commentators assumed, (1) the stimuli
were color drawings, not photographs, that did not exaggerate racial features; and (2) while
several of the studies focused on children's reasoning about blacks and whites, several also
explored children's beliefs about Hispanic/white and Hispanic/black comparisons.
5. Indeed, she does not deny this. Rather she suggests that there is some inconsistency
in the results reported, citing as an example a recent ethnography of preschoolers by Ausdale
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and Feagin (1996). In fact, Ausdale and Feagin's main point is that previous researchers have
underestimated the extent to which "children create and assign meaning for racial and ethnic
concepts," particularly the "clear and often sophisticated understanding" that children have
of these concepts (1996:779). This, of course, is the point that I am trying to make. In terms
of preschoolers using race in the regulation of power and friendship, Ausdale and Feagin
report only one incident of overtly and explicitly racial exclusion, an incident that everyone
involved makes clear was exceptional in the extreme. Most of the incidents that they interpret
as racial bias involve differences in language as well as differences in race. This is consistent
with other studies revealing that bias does emerge when, but only when, ethnicity or race is
mapped onto language (see Hirschfeld 1996:139 for a discussion of this point). Other
examples Ausdale and Feagin discuss turn on much more indirect evidence of race, and often
involve only indirect evidence of bias (as when, e.g., a child talks about the skin color of
another child or talk about ethnic food, or even the color of a toy). That children notice racial
features does not mean that they use these features in the service of exclusion (although they
might use them occasionally for purposes of inclusion, see Fishbein and Imai 1993).
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